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Fiscal convergence and sustainability in the European Union
Vladimir Arčabić*
Vladimir Arčabić
Affiliation: University of Zagreb, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Macroeconomics and Economic Development, Zagreb, Croatia
0000-0003-4173-8637
Correspondence
varcabic@efzg.hr
Article | Year: 2018 | Pages: 353 - 380 | Volume: 42 | Issue: 4 Received: June 1, 2018 | Accepted: October 10, 2018 | Published online: December 14, 2018
|
FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
(a)
Government Debt convergence results
|
log(t)
|
All
Countries
|
|
γ
|
-0.253*
|
|
|
|
|
t-stat
|
-22.13
|
|
|
|
|
Club classification
|
log(t)
|
Club1
[19]
|
Club2
[9]
|
|
|
|
γ
|
-0.00900
|
0.560
|
|
|
|
t-stat
|
-0.686
|
6.100
|
|
|
|
(b)
Government Revenues convergence results
|
|
log(t)
|
All
Countries
|
|
|
|
γ
|
-0.729*
|
|
|
|
t-stat
|
-33.34
|
|
|
|
Club classification
|
|
log(t)
|
Club1
[19]
|
Club2
[5]
|
Club3
[2]
|
Group4
[2]
|
|
γ
|
0.00700
|
0.792
|
0.114
|
-3.378*
|
|
t-stat
|
0.527
|
22.75
|
0.395
|
-2.779
|
|
(c)
Government Expenditures convergence results
|
log(t)
|
All
Countries
|
|
|
|
|
γ
|
-1.075*
|
|
|
|
|
t-stat
|
-10.68
|
|
|
|
|
Club classification
|
log(t)
|
Club1
[5]
|
Club2
[11]
|
Club3
[6]
|
Club4
[3]
|
Club5
[2]
|
γ
|
0.284
|
0.264
|
0.113
|
0.851
|
-0.125
|
t-stat
|
1.016
|
16.05
|
8.963
|
9.936
|
-0.154
|
Final classification
|
|
log(t)
|
Club1
[5]
|
Club2
[11]
|
Club3
[9]
|
Club4
[2]
|
|
γ
|
0.284
|
0.264
|
0.169
|
-0.125
|
|
t-stat
|
1.016
|
16.05
|
14.93
|
-0.154
|
|
Note: The table presents γ coefficient from log t regression together with t-statistics. * Marks a rejection of convergence at 5% level. Numbers in brackets are number of countries in the club. Club classification is a result of the initial clustering algorithm. Final classification is a result after club merging. Final classification is presented only when club merging is significant. Countries that form different clubs are presented in figure 3.
Note: Convergence clubs are in squares, non-convergent groups are in circles.
2a: Percent of countries
converging to the average gov. debt (%)
|
ADF
|
Lee & Strazicich
|
Enders & Lee
|
EU
[28]
|
3.57
|
3.57
|
7.14
|
Club
1 [19]
|
0.00
|
5.26
|
5.26
|
Club
2 [9]
|
22.22
|
0.00
|
0.00
|
2b: Percent of
countries converging to the average gov. revenues (%)
|
ADF
|
Lee & Strazicich
|
Enders & Lee
|
EU
[28]
|
35.71
|
85.71
|
46.43
|
Club
1 [19]
|
42.11
|
94.74
|
57.89
|
Club
2 [5]
|
40.00
|
100.00
|
40.00
|
Club
3 [2]
|
0.00
|
100.00
|
100.00
|
2c: Percent of
countries converging to the average gov. expenditures (%)
|
ADF
|
Lee & Strazicich
|
Enders & Lee
|
EU
[28]
|
39.29
|
78.57
|
46.43
|
Club
1 [5]
|
40.00
|
100.00
|
40.00
|
Club
2 [11]
|
54.55
|
90.91
|
81.81
|
Club
3 [9]
|
33.33
|
77.78
|
55.56
|
Club
4 [2]
|
100.00
|
100.00
|
100.00
|
Notes: Rejection rates of unit root hypothesis at 10% level of significance are reported in the table. Number of countries in a club is in brackets. The rejection rate is calculated as (# of rejections/ # of countries within a club)×100.
Models
|
Model 1
Benchmark
|
Model 2
Club 1
|
Model 3
Club 2
|
Model 4
EU-15
|
Model 5
EU-13
|
Model 6
debt ≥ 90%
|
Model 7
debt < 90%
|
Variables
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus (lagged) (
)
|
0.502***
|
0.415***
|
0.390***
|
0.547***
|
0.308**
|
0.573**
|
0.526***
|
|
(0.08)
|
(0.09)
|
(0.10)
|
(0.06)
|
(0.11)
|
(0.21)
|
(0.10)
|
Debt (
)
|
-0.018
|
-0.009
|
-0.043
|
-0.029
|
0.040
|
0.036
|
-0.057*
|
|
(0.01)
|
(0.01)
|
(0.12)
|
(0.02)
|
(0.03)
|
(0.08)
|
(0.03)
|
Output Gap (
)
|
0.286***
|
0.413***
|
0.435***
|
0.394***
|
0.388**
|
0.297**
|
0.305***
|
|
(0.05)
|
(0.07)
|
(0.13)
|
(0.04)
|
(0.15)
|
(0.09)
|
(0.07)
|
Constant
|
0.776
|
0.122
|
2.030
|
1.879
|
-2.351*
|
-4.298
|
2.459*
|
|
(0.76)
|
(1.06)
|
(5.63)
|
(1.23)
|
(1.15)
|
(8.69)
|
(1.44)
|
Observations
|
1,708
|
1,159
|
549
|
915
|
793
|
281
|
1,427
|
Number of countries
|
28
|
19
|
9
|
15
|
13
|
9
|
26
|
F-test
|
0
|
3.40e-06
|
0.00139
|
0
|
2.43e-05
|
0.00352
|
0
|
# of instruments
|
23
|
14
|
11
|
14
|
11
|
11
|
20
|
Hansen test
|
0.222
|
0.100
|
0.371
|
0.175
|
0.102
|
0.506
|
0.166
|
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***, **, and * mark statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Model 1 is the benchmark model. Models 2 and 3 include countries from endogenous debt convergence clubs 1 and 2, respectively. Models 4 and 5 include EU-15 and EU-13 countries, and models 6 and 7 include subsamples with government debt ≥ 90% and debt < 90% of GDP, respectively.
Models
|
Model 1
Benchmark
|
Model 2
Club 1
|
Model 3
Club 2
|
Model 4
EU-15
|
Model 5
EU-13
|
Model 6
debt ≥ 90%
|
Model 7
debt < 90%
|
Variables
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus
|
Surplus (lagged) (
)
|
0.512***
|
0.515***
|
0.491***
|
0.637***
|
0.336***
|
0.248**
|
0.611***
|
|
(0.06)
|
(0.07)
|
(0.12)
|
(0.04)
|
(0.07)
|
(0.10)
|
(0.09)
|
Debt (
)
|
0.006
|
0.004
|
0.025
|
0.003
|
0.029**
|
0.031**
|
-0.009
|
|
(0.01)
|
(0.01)
|
(0.02)
|
(0.00)
|
(0.01)
|
(0.01)
|
(0.01)
|
Output Gap (
)
|
0.176***
|
0.172***
|
0.209**
|
0.226***
|
0.197***
|
0.213
|
0.133***
|
|
(0.04)
|
(0.04)
|
(0.09)
|
(0.03)
|
(0.05)
|
(0.12)
|
(0.04)
|
Constant
|
-0.614*
|
-0.713
|
-0.998
|
-0.327
|
-1.831***
|
-3.951**
|
0.168
|
|
(0.36)
|
(0.42)
|
(0.71)
|
(0.35)
|
(0.40)
|
(1.48)
|
(0.63)
|
Observations
|
1,708
|
1,159
|
549
|
915
|
793
|
281
|
1,427
|
Number of countries
|
0.304
|
0.298
|
0.335
|
0.457
|
0.173
|
0.123
|
0.384
|
F-test
|
28
|
19
|
9
|
15
|
13
|
9
|
26
|
# of instruments
|
0.512***
|
0.515***
|
0.491***
|
0.637***
|
0.336***
|
0.248**
|
0.611***
|
Hansen test
|
(0.06)
|
(0.07)
|
(0.12)
|
(0.04)
|
(0.07)
|
(0.10)
|
(0.09)
|
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***, **, and * mark statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Model 1 is the benchmark model. Models 2 and 3 include countries from endogenous debt convergence clubs 1 and 2, respectively. Models 4 and 5 include EU-15 and EU-13 countries, and models 6 and 7 include subsamples with government debt ≥ 90% and debt < 90% of GDP, respectively.
Country
|
Revenues
|
Expenditures
|
Debt
|
Surplus
|
Mean
|
St. dev.
|
Mean
|
St. dev.
|
Mean
|
St. dev.
|
Mean
|
St. dev.
|
Belgium
|
0.498
|
0.014
|
0.519
|
0.029
|
102.371
|
6.191
|
1.489
|
2.662
|
Bulgaria
|
0.375
|
0.032
|
0.378
|
0.035
|
25.430
|
12.762
|
0.809
|
3.995
|
Czech R.
|
0.397
|
0.021
|
0.427
|
0.030
|
34.493
|
6.377
|
-1.570
|
2.538
|
Denmark
|
0.542
|
0.012
|
0.537
|
0.025
|
41.284
|
6.727
|
2.350
|
2.937
|
Germany
|
0.439
|
0.011
|
0.453
|
0.017
|
69.791
|
6.443
|
0.853
|
1.749
|
Estonia
|
0.380
|
0.027
|
0.376
|
0.035
|
6.770
|
2.386
|
0.605
|
2.605
|
Ireland
|
0.331
|
0.031
|
0.374
|
0.095
|
63.992
|
35.900
|
-3.019
|
8.925
|
Greece
|
0.427
|
0.042
|
0.501
|
0.052
|
135.084
|
31.814
|
-2.996
|
4.643
|
Spain
|
0.380
|
0.016
|
0.417
|
0.035
|
64.440
|
24.433
|
-1.729
|
4.398
|
France
|
0.506
|
0.016
|
0.544
|
0.023
|
78.400
|
13.788
|
-1.601
|
1.526
|
Croatia
|
0.433
|
0.030
|
0.478
|
0.030
|
56.491
|
19.248
|
-1.880
|
2.281
|
Italy
|
0.453
|
0.019
|
0.485
|
0.019
|
115.085
|
12.457
|
1.345
|
1.277
|
Cyprus
|
0.365
|
0.030
|
0.395
|
0.055
|
73.230
|
21.307
|
-0.192
|
5.510
|
Latvia
|
0.352
|
0.022
|
0.374
|
0.036
|
26.770
|
14.433
|
-1.088
|
3.003
|
Lithuania
|
0.341
|
0.013
|
0.367
|
0.039
|
28.502
|
10.293
|
-1.275
|
3.675
|
Luxembourg
|
0.434
|
0.013
|
0.418
|
0.026
|
14.941
|
7.215
|
1.360
|
1.821
|
Hungary
|
0.444
|
0.021
|
0.490
|
0.023
|
69.585
|
8.796
|
-0.745
|
3.255
|
Malta
|
0.384
|
0.020
|
0.416
|
0.023
|
66.048
|
4.001
|
0.266
|
2.870
|
Netherlands
|
0.429
|
0.009
|
0.446
|
0.021
|
56.298
|
8.245
|
-0.165
|
2.086
|
Austria
|
0.489
|
0.012
|
0.513
|
0.019
|
76.310
|
6.738
|
0.363
|
1.796
|
Poland
|
0.395
|
0.013
|
0.435
|
0.018
|
48.860
|
5.134
|
-1.724
|
1.608
|
Portugal
|
0.415
|
0.021
|
0.469
|
0.035
|
92.343
|
30.325
|
-1.906
|
3.499
|
Romania
|
0.335
|
0.016
|
0.367
|
0.033
|
25.756
|
10.096
|
-1.550
|
3.267
|
Slovenia
|
0.434
|
0.010
|
0.472
|
0.048
|
44.276
|
22.349
|
-1.759
|
4.888
|
Slovakia
|
0.373
|
0.024
|
0.417
|
0.039
|
43.263
|
8.989
|
-1.969
|
2.157
|
Finland
|
0.531
|
0.013
|
0.520
|
0.040
|
46.337
|
10.241
|
1.891
|
3.288
|
Sweden
|
0.520
|
0.019
|
0.515
|
0.016
|
42.539
|
4.814
|
1.568
|
1.730
|
UK
|
0.378
|
0.012
|
0.420
|
0.036
|
60.967
|
22.826
|
-2.558
|
2.478
|
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December, 2018 IV/2018 |