2964
Views
81
Downloads |
Governance quality vs. stimulus size: fiscal policy effectiveness during the COVID-19 pandemic
Mert Topcu* 
Mert Topcu
Affiliation: Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Antalya, Türkiye
 0000-0001-8236-9810
Correspondence
mert.topcu@alanya.edu.tr
Mustafa Alpin Gulsen *
Mustafa Alpin Gulsen
Affiliation: Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Antalya, Türkiye
0000-0002-2860-4469
Article | Year: 2025 | Pages: 251 - 272 | Volume: 49 | Issue: 2 Received: December 25, 2024 | Accepted: March 23, 2025 | Published online: June 7, 2025
|
FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
|
Principle component
|
Proportion of variance
|
Cumulative proportion
|
|
PC1
|
85.1
|
85.1
|
|
PC2
|
6.7
|
91.9
|
|
PC3
|
4.5
|
96.5
|
|
PC4
|
2.0
|
98.6
|
|
PC5
|
0.8
|
99.4
|
|
PC6
|
0.5
|
100.0
|
Source: Authors’ calculation.
|
Variables
|
Obs.
|
Mean
|
Std. dev.
|
Min.
|
Max.
|
|
Growth
|
144
|
-0.010
|
0.053
|
-0.179
|
0.165
|
|
Capital
|
144
|
7.116
|
1.541
|
2.978
|
10.561
|
|
Education
|
143
|
2.079
|
0.457
|
0.470
|
2.653
|
|
Lockdown policy
|
144
|
3.988
|
0.451
|
1.868
|
4.497
|
|
Fiscal stimulus
|
144
|
2.293
|
1.211
|
-1.647
|
8.202
|
|
Governance quality
|
144
|
-0.150
|
1.379
|
-2.304
|
2.222
|
|
|
Growth
|
Capital
|
Education
|
Lockdown policy
|
Fiscal stimulus
|
|
Growth
|
1.000
|
|
|
|
|
|
Capital
|
0.187
|
1.000
|
|
|
|
|
Education
|
0.191
|
0.690
|
1.000
|
|
|
|
Lockdown policy
|
-0.163
|
0.416
|
0.435
|
1.000
|
|
|
Fiscal stimulus
|
0.048
|
0.436
|
0.376
|
0.227
|
1.000
|
|
|
Panel A: Full Sample
|
Panel B: Robustness Check
|
|
Regimes
|
Coefficients
|
Coefficients
|
|
Regime 1
|
-0.045***
(0.009)
|
-0.027**
(0.014)
|
-0.040***
(0.012)
|
-0.041***
(0.015)
|
|
Regime 2
|
0.017
(0.015)
|
0.001
(0.013)
|
0.038
(0.018)
|
0.002
(0.016)
|
|
Regime 3
|
-
|
0.039**
(0.019)
|
-
|
0.039**
(0.019)
|
|
Threshold variable
|
fiscal stimulus
|
δ
|
fiscal stimulus
|
δ
|
|
Threshold order
|
1: 1.395
|
1: -0.736
2: 0.145
|
1: 1.798
|
1: -0.761
2: 0.145
|
Note: Regressions include a regime varying constant. The results of regime-varying control variables are not reported. δ is an interaction of governance quality with the reverse of the fiscal stimulus. White-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The maximum number of thresholds has been set to 2. Source: Authors’ calculation.
|
Below threshold value 1
|
Above threshold value 2
|
|
Angola
|
Gabon
|
Myanmar
|
Algeria
|
Denmark
|
Israel
|
Saudi Arabia
|
|
Bangladesh
|
Haiti
|
Nicaragua
|
Australia
|
Estonia
|
Jamaica
|
Slovak Republic
|
|
Belarus
|
Iraq
|
Nigeria
|
Austria
|
Finland
|
Malaysia
|
South Korea
|
|
Central African Republic
|
Kenya
|
Republic of Congo
|
Belgium
|
France
|
Mauritius
|
Spain
|
|
Chad
|
Laos
|
Tajikistan
|
Botswana
|
Georgia
|
Namibia
|
Sweden
|
|
Democratic Congo
|
Liberia
|
Tanzania
|
Canada
|
Germany
|
Netherlands
|
Switzerland
|
|
Ecuador
|
Libya
|
Turkmenistan
|
Chile
|
Hong Kong
|
New Zealand
|
United Arab Emirates
|
|
Egypt
|
Malawi
|
Uzbekistan
|
Costa Rica
|
Hungary
|
Norway
|
United Kingdom
|
|
Eswatini
|
Mali
|
Zimbabwe
|
Czech Republic
|
Ireland
|
Portugal
|
Uruguay
|
Source: Authors’ calculation.
|
Albania
|
Burundi
|
Egypt
|
Hong Kong
|
Latvia
|
Nepal
|
Romania
|
Tanzania
|
|
Algeria
|
Cambodia
|
El Salvador
|
Hungary
|
Lesotho
|
Netherlands
|
Russia
|
Thailand
|
|
Angola
|
Cameroon
|
Eritrea
|
India
|
Liberia
|
New Zealand
|
Rwanda
|
Togo
|
|
Argentina
|
Canada
|
Estonia
|
Indonesia
|
Libya
|
Nicaragua
|
Saudi Arabia
|
Trinidad Tobago
|
|
Australia
|
Central African Republic
|
Eswatini
|
Iran
|
Lithuania
|
Niger
|
Senegal
|
Tunisia
|
|
Austria
|
Chad
|
Ethiopia
|
Iraq
|
Madagascar
|
Nigeria
|
Serbia
|
Turkey
|
|
Azerbaijan
|
Chile
|
Finland
|
Ireland
|
Malawi
|
Norway
|
Sierra Leone
|
Turkmenistan
|
|
Bahrain
|
China
|
France
|
Israel
|
Malaysia
|
Oman
|
Singapore
|
UAE
|
|
Bangladesh
|
Colombia
|
Gabon
|
Italy
|
Mali
|
Pakistan
|
Slovak Republic
|
Uganda
|
|
Belarus
|
Costa Rica
|
Gambia
|
Jamaica
|
Mauritania
|
Panama
|
Slovenia
|
UK
|
|
Belgium
|
Cote Ivory
|
Georgia
|
Japan
|
Mauritius
|
Papua New Guinea
|
South Africa
|
Ukraine
|
|
Benin
|
Croatia
|
Germany
|
Jordan
|
Mexico
|
Paraguay
|
South Korea
|
United States
|
|
Bolivia
|
Cyprus
|
Ghana
|
Kazakhstan
|
Moldova
|
Peru
|
Spain
|
Uruguay
|
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Czech Republic
|
Greece
|
Kenya
|
Mongolia
|
Philippines
|
Sri Lanka
|
Uzbekistan
|
|
Botswana
|
Democratic Republic of Congo
|
Guatemala
|
Kosovo
|
Morocco
|
Poland
|
Sudan
|
Vietnam
|
|
Brazil
|
Denmark
|
Guinea
|
Kuwait
|
Mozambique
|
Portugal
|
Sweden
|
Yemen
|
|
Bulgaria
|
Dominican Republic
|
Haiti
|
Kyrgyz Republic
|
Myanmar
|
Qatar
|
Switzerland
|
Zambia
|
|
Burkina Faso
|
Ecuador
|
Honduras
|
Laos
|
Namibia
|
Republic of Congo
|
Tajikistan
|
Zimbabwe
|
Crossmark is a multi-publisher initiative from Crossref to provide a standard way for readers to locate the current version of a piece of content. By applying the Crossmark logo, the Institute of Public Finance is committing to maintaining the content it publishes and to alerting readers to changes if and when they occur. Clicking on the Crossmark logo will tell you the current status of a document and may also give you additional publication record information about the document.
|
|
June, 2025
II/2025
|
