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Is it worth raising the normal retirement age? A new model to estimate the employment effects
Hermes Morgavi*
Article | Year: 2025 | Pages: 339 - 367 | Volume: 49 | Issue: 3 Received: December 16, 2024 | Accepted: March 27, 2025 | Published online: September 3, 2025
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FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
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Effect
of raising the normal retirement age by 12 months on average age of labour market
exit (months)
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Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999)
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1.1 to
1.4
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Gal and Theising (2015)
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1.4
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Égert and Gal (2017)
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1.4
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Grigoli, Koczan and Tapalova
(2018)
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2.3
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Geppert et al. (2019)
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2.4
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Turner and Morgavi (2021)
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2.7-4.7
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Note: The original studies reported their findings in terms of an effect on the employment rate or labour force participation rate. The figures reported here are the result of the author’s calculations, which are detailed in Turner and Morgavi (2021) and the appendix, and are made both to provide all estimations on a comparable basis and provide an estimate of the absolute effect on the average age of labour market exit to compare with an increase in the normal retirement age of 12 months. The calculations are based on estimated parameters reported in the respective studies, but also involve some additional assumptions. Hence, the figures in the table should be regarded as approximate, although they are robust to reasonable variations in these assumptions. Source: Author’s calculations described in the appendix.
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Minimum
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Median
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Mean
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Maximum
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Standard
deviation
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ER 55-74
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13.3
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32.0
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32.7
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57.5
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9.7
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UBGR
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1.9
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26.7
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23.5
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55.5
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12.7
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ALMP
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2.3
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27.7
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31.2
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97.5
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21.4
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Average tax wedge
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1.9
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31.0
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30.0
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48.3
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9.2
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Excess coverage
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-4.7
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20.7
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29.6
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87.3
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26.7
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EPL
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0.1
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2.3
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2.1
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4.6
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0.9
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ETCR
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0.5
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1.8
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2.1
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5.4
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1.0
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ER 25-54
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58.4
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80.2
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79.0
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88.6
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5.4
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LE 65
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74.4
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93.4
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92.9
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115.0
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8.1
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Note: ER 55-74 is the employment rate of people aged 55-74 expressed in percentage; UBGR is the gross unemployment benefit levels expressed in percentage of the previous gross earning; ALMP is the detrended active labour market policy spending on employment as a share of GDP per capita; Average tax wedge is the average tax wedge for a couple with 2 children and prime earner at 100% and second earner at 67% of the average wage; Excess coverage is the difference between the coverage of wage bargaining agreement, expressed in percentage, and the share of workers who are represented by unions covered; EPL is the OECD Strictness of employment protection for regular contract from individual and collective dismissals, the indicator, which measures the strictness of employment protection on a scale from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate more stringent regulations; ETCR is the component on regulation of network industries of the OECD PMR indicator, which measures the pro-competitive regulatory settings on a scale from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate more restrictive regulations; ER 25-54 is the employment rate of people aged 25-54 expressed in percentage; LE 65 is the life expectancy at 65. This last variable is computed by multiplying the life expectancy in years for women and for men by the share of men and women aged 65+ on the population aged 55-74 expressed as percentage. These statistics are calculated on the estimation sample, which starts from 1992 and ends in 2019, with different coverage among countries. Source: For ER 55-74, OECD Employment database; for UBGR, OECD Social Protection and Well-being database; for ALMP, OECD Labour database; for Average tax wedge, OECD Tax statistics database; for Excess coverage, ICTWSS database; for EPL, OECD Labour database; for ETCR, OECD PMR indicator database; for ER 25-54, OECD Employment database; for LE 65, OECD Health database; and OECD Employment database.
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Explanatory variables
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Dependent
variable: employment rate of the 55-74 age group
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Variant
equations
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(1)
Base
model
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(2)
(1)
+ % pop. above normal ret. age
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(3)
(2)
+ Minimum retirement age
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(4)
(3)
+ Private-pension countries
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(5)
(4)
+ Pipeline effect
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Labour and product market regulations
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EPL regular contracts
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5.863**
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6.283**
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7.932**
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8.138**
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8.448**
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Pension policies
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Normal retirement age
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1.320**
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Pipeline effect
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-0.087
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% pop. above minimum ret. age
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-0.098
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-0.095
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-0.132
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% pop. above normal ret. age
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-0.286**
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-0.243**
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% pop. above normal ret. age
(private pensions countries)
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-0.172
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-0.176
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% pop. above normal ret. age
(non- private pensions countries)
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-0.256**
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% pop. above normal ret. age
(early exit countries)
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-0.265**
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% pop. above normal ret. age
(other countries)
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-0.275***
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Other variables
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ER 25-54
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0.615***
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0.608***
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0.586***
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0.583***
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0.606***
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Life expectancy 65+
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0.561***
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0.538***
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0.506***
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0.516***
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0.493***
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RMSE
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2.66
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2.60
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2.61
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2.60
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2.60
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Adjusted
(%)
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91.8
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92.2
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92.1
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92.1
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92.1
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Obs.
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522
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522
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522
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522
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522
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Countries
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27
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27
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27
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27
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27
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Time coverage
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1992-2019
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1992
- 2019
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1992-2019
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1992-2019
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1992-2019
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Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients of the long-term equation of the model. Model (1) corresponds to the base model. Model (2) is the same as model (1) but instead of using the normal retirement age for pensions as pension policy variable, the share of population above the normal retirement age is used. Model (3) uses the database created by Geppert et al. (2019) integrated with the data from OECD (2021, 2023), which distinguish between minimum retirement age and normal retirement age. Model (4) introduces the distinction between countries where the private pension funds are important. Model (5) is equivalent to model (4), but the pipeline effect for early exit countries is added. The RMSE and the adjusted R2 shown in the table refer to the long-term equation only and hence are computed excluding the lagged and leading variables used in the Dynamic OLS methodology to estimate it. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Source: Author’s calculation.
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Minimum
retirement age
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Normal
retirement age
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Men
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Women
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Men
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Women
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Minimum retirement age (men)
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1.00
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Minimum retirement age (women)
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0.73
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1.00
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Normal retirement age (men)
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0.28
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0.41
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1.00
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Normal retirement age (women)
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-0.10
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0.52
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0.59
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1.00
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Note: The table shows the correlation among the retirement age variables. Source: Author’s calculation.
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(1)
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(2)
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(3)
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(4)
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(5)
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Study
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Country
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Year of reform1
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Increase in normal retirement age (months)
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Effect on average effective age of retirement (months)
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Original study
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Proposed model
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Mastrobuoni
(2009)
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USA
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2000
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2
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1
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0.6
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Fehr, Kallweit
and Kindermann (2012)
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DEU
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2008
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24
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9-12
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8.4
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Hanel and
Riphahn (2012)
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CHE
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2001 & 2005
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12
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2.3-5.4
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4.2-4.3
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Lalive
and Staubli (2015)
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CHE
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2001
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12
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7.9
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4.2
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Etgeton
(2018)
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DEU
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2012
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24
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8.4
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8.1
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Fodor,
Roehn and Hwang (2022)
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SVK
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2020
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7
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7
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5.7
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Note: (1) The year refers to the year of the pension reform analysed or to the year of reference
of the quantification. (2) The quantification using the proposed model is made by estimating the
effect of a 1-year increase in the country’s normal retirement age for the specified year, using the
estimates from model (5) in table 3 and the data on the demographic composition in the estimation sample for the specific year. The estimated impact for a 1-year increase was subsequently
rescaled to the actual change. Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 1The effect of raising the normal retirement age in previous OECD and IMF studies DISPLAY Table
Figure 1Model innovations give larger employment effects from raising the retirement age DISPLAY Figure
Table 2Summary table of the variables DISPLAY Table
Table 3Long term equations explaining the older age employment rate DISPLAY Table
Table 4Correlation among retirement ages DISPLAY Table
Table 5The predictions of the model are consistent with those of single-country studies DISPLAY Table
Figure 2Policy simulations changing the gap between the minimum and normal retirement ages (percentage points) DISPLAY Figure
Figure 3The countries with the lowest old age employment rate also have big retirement age gaps DISPLAY Figure
Figure A1Model visualisation DISPLAY Figure
Figure A2Comparing the effects on ER-55-74 and on AALME under the proposed model DISPLAY Figure
* I would like to thank Christophe André for detailed and thoughtful comments on a previous draft, David Turner for his generous support and guidance in the drafting of this paper, as well as Veronica Humi for help with the editorial process. I am also grateful for comments of two anonymous referees.
1 The average age of labour market exit is the average age of all persons withdrawing from the labour force in a given period, whether during any particular year or over any five-year period. The average age of labour market exit (AALME) is thus simply the sum of each year of age weighted by the proportion of all withdrawals from the labour force occurring in that year of age (see Boulhol and Keese, 2021).
2 For the purpose of this paper, the terms “average age of labour market exit” and “effective retirement age” are used interchangeably.
3 Turner and Morgavi ( 2021), in fact, used a dataset collecting the labour market variables by education, sex and single year of age from the Eurostat Labour Force Surveys for the European countries, the Current Population Survey for the United States and the Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey for Canada. Most of the European countries instead provide data in 5-year age bands.
4 The retirement ages are taken from the country notes of past editions of the OECD publication Pensions at a Glance for both men and women separately. For the base model, the two retirement ages are then aggregated using a weighted average, with the share of population by sex as weights.
5 The excess coverage variable is defined as the difference between the coverage of wage bargaining agreement and the share of covered workers who are represented by unions. This variable is computed from the data in the ICTWSS database.
6 The OECD indicators of employment protection legislation (EPL) evaluate the regulations on the dismissal of workers on regular contracts and the hiring of workers on temporary contracts. For the present work the indicator for regular contracts is used. They cover both individual and collective dismissals.
7 The OECD indicators of regulation in energy, transport and communications (ETCR) summarise regulatory provisions in seven sectors: telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and road freight.
8 For further discussion on the subject, see the appendix.
9 These variables are calculated based on the country notes of the past editions of Pensions at a Glance for both men and women separately.
10 Manoli and Weber ( 2016) using Austrian administrative data on the 2000 and 2004 pension reform estimated that, a 1-year increase in the minimum retirement age led to a 4.8-month increase in the average job-exiting age and a 6-month increase in the average retirement age.
11 For the purposes of the current estimation, countries are characterised as having an important voluntary private pension system if voluntary private pensions cover a large share of the working population and the replacement rate from such schemes is at least 60% of that in the public mandatory pension scheme. Using data from tables 5.3 and 9.1 in OECD ( 2019), this includes Canada, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
12 The two coefficients are estimated separately by creating two variables: the first one is obtained by interacting the variable “share of population above the retirement age with a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the country is a “private pension” one and zero otherwise; the second one is obtained by interacting the variable“share of population above the retirement age with a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the country is not a “private pension” one and zero otherwise. This method reduces the power of the estimators but avoids problems of multicollinearity.
13 For the purpose of this paper, “less-educated” corresponds to the levels 0-2 of the 2011 standard of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
14 Staubli ( 2011) show that tighter eligibility criteria in the Austrian disability insurance program induced an increase in employment of 1.6 to 3.4 percentage points and brought important spillover effects into the unemployment and sickness insurance program. Borghans, Gielen and Luttmer ( 2014) show that more stringent criteria for accessing the disability insurance benefits induced in the Netherlands an increase in the employment rate by 2.9 percentage points and, at the same time, an increase in other social assistance programmes.
15 Staubli and Zweimüller ( 2013), using the social security data for Austria, estimate that the gradual rise in the minimum retirement age from 55 to 58.25 for women and from 60 to 62 for men between 2001 and 2010 resulted in an increase in the employment rate by 9.75 percentage points for men and 11 percentage points for women. They also estimated that, at the same time, unemployment increased by 12.5 percentage points among men and by 11.8 percentage points among women.
16 For example, in Belgium the normal retirement age for women in the period 1998-2007 was raised 5 times from 60 to 65 while the minimum retirement age remained constant at 60; in Switzerland the normal retirement age for women was raised twice, in 2001 and 2005 while the minimum retirement age remained constant at 62. In the Czech Republic, the normal retirement age was for both men and women raised twice, in 2019 and 2020 while the minimum retirement age remained constant; in Germany the normal retirement age for both men and women was raised in 2018 while the minimum retirement age remained constant; and in Portugal the normal retirement age for women was raised 3 times in the period 1994-8 while the minimum retirement age remained constant. Other countries instead raised the statutory retirement age while at the same time they lowered minimum retirement age: for example, Italy for male workers in 2012.
17 The correspondent underlying model is described in the appendix while figure A1 visualise the effects of the four reforms using the underlying model.
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September, 2025 III/2025
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