Social welfare dynamics in post-socialist countries: unveiling the secrets of success

Slukhai, Sergii; Borshchenko, Tetiana

doi:10.3326/pse.43.2.3.

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Social welfare dynamics in post-socialist countries: unveiling the secrets of success

Sergii Slukhai*

Sergii Slukhai

Affiliation: Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Department of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine

0000-0001-8839-2042

Correspondence
serg1955@meta.ua

Tetiana Borshchenko*

Tetiana Borshchenko

Affiliation: Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Department of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine

0000-0002-2519-8207

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https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.43.2.3

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Social welfare dynamics in post-socialist countries: unveiling the secrets of success

Sergii Slukhai, Tetiana Borshchenko

https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.43.2.3 | Published online: June 10, 2019

Graph 1
The interaction of social welfare factors

Source: designed by the authors.

Graph 2
Division of CEE countries by clusters, 1995

Source: calculated by the authors basing on World Bank (2017).

Graph 3
Division of CEE countries by clusters, 2016

Source: calculated by the authors basing on World Bank (2017).

Graph 4
Social welfare dynamics by clusters, 1995-2016

Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of information UNDP (2017); World Bank (2017).

Graph 5
Social welfare dynamics for cluster A countries, 1995-2016

Source: calculated by the authors basing on UNDP (2017); World Bank (2017).

Graph 6
Social welfare dynamics for cluster B countries, 1995-2016

Source: calculated by the authors basing on UNDP (2017); World Bank (2017).

Graph 7
Social welfare dynamics in the cluster C countries, 1995-2016

Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of information UNDP (2017); World Bank (2017).

Graph 8
Social welfare dynamics in cluster D countries, 1995-2016

Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of information UNDP (2017); World Bank (2017).

Table 1
Results of regression analysis

c₆

R²

The whole sample
(N = 440 )

0.4993

(0.5990)

0.0753

(0.3502)

0.8381*

(0.0760)

0.0414**

(0.0165)

0.0354

(0.4220)

3.5573

(0.0000)

0.483

Cluster А
(N = 132)

0.1615**

(0.0392)

0.0475***

(0.0036)

1.2538**

(0.0195)

0.0648**

(0.0299)

0.1411***

(0.0004)

7.667

(0.0001)

0.836

Cluster В
(N = 66)

1.8375***

(0.0051)

2.9436***

(0.0000)

0.8009**

(0.0344)

0.5018**

(0.0154)

0.1370**

(0.0381)

16.07

(0.0000)

0.869

Cluster С
(N = 88)

0.3662

(0.1117)

0.0411**

(0.0311)

0.7958***

(0.0000)

0.0120***

(0.0022)

0.0499**

(0.0428)

2.8553

(0.0000)

0.879

Cluster D
(N = 154)

- 0.026

(0.8461)

0.4096***

(0.0004)

0.7749***

(0,0000)

0.0662*

(0.0614)

-0.3553*** (0.0000)

1.3923

(0.1072)

0.683

Source: Calculated by the authors basing on (EBRD, 2017; HF, 2017; UNDP, 2017; World Bank, 2017).

Table A1
SSWI crosscut for CEE countries, 2016 (in descending order)

Country	SSWI
Cluster A
Slovenia	11,854
Czech Republic	10,574
Slovakia	9,260
Poland	7,209
Hungary	6,697
Croatia	6,547
Cluster A average	8,690
Cluster B
Estonia	9,128
Lithuania	7,310
Latvia	6,818
Cluster B average	7,752
Cluster C
Romania	5,104
Montenegro	3,971
Bulgaria	3,712
Serbia	2,944
Cluster C average	3,933
Cluster D
Belarus	3,654
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2,620
Albania	2,456
Republic of North Macedonia	2,295
Russian Federation	2,262
Moldova	1,354
Ukraine	1,344
Cluster D average	2,284
Whole sample average	5,665

Source: calculated by the authors basing on World Bank (2017).

Table A2
Generalized cluster-wide statistics on social welfare factors, 2016

		Index of economic freedom	EBRD transition indicator	Public expenditures on education (per cent to GDP)	Public healthcare expenditures (per cent to GDP)	Per capita GDP at PPP, $
Cluster А	Average value	62.17	3.55	4.57	5.18	19,464
Cluster А	Standard deviation	5.85	0.56	0.63	0.72	7,034
Cluster В	Average value	64.10	3.60	5.35	4.24	16,174
Cluster В	Standard deviation	7.62	0.47	0.63	0.64	7,687
Cluster С	Average value	55.77	3.04	3.77	4.32	11,039
Cluster С	Standard deviation	8.77	0.66	0.65	0.89	5,092
Cluster D	Average value	53.86	2.92	3.85	4.21	7,222
Cluster D	Standard deviation	8.77	.56	1.48	1.02	4,226

Source: calculated by the authors basing on EBRD (2017); HF (2017); UNDP (2017); World Bank (2017).

Table A3
Phases of postcommunist transformations according to Z. Brzezinski

Political	Legal/regulatory	Economic	Western Aid
Phase One: 1-5 Years Political goal: transformation Economic goal: stabilization
Basic democracy; free press; end of one-party state & police system; Initial democratic coalition for change	Elimination of arbitrary state controls	Elimination of price controls and subsides; end of collectivization; haphazard privatization	Currency stabilization; emergency credits & aid
Phase two: 3-10 years Political goal: from transformation to stabilization Economic goal: from stabilization to transformation
New constitution & electoral law; elections; decentralized regional self-government; stable democratic coalition - new political elite	Legal/regulatory framework for property & business	Banking system; small & middle scale privatization; demonopolization; new economic class appears	Infrastructural credits; technical & managerial assistance; trade preferences & access; initial foreign investment
Phase Three: 5-15 (+) Years Political Goal: Consolidation Economic Goal: Sustained Take-Off
Formation of stable democratic parties; democratic political culture takes	Independent judiciary & legal culture emerges	Large-scale privatization; capitalist lobbies; entrepreneurial culture emerges	Major foreign investment; inclusion in key western organs (e.g. EC, NATO, etc.)

Source: Brzezinski, 1995.

Table A4
Model for the total sample

Table A5
Model for the cluster A countries

Table A6
Model for the cluster B countries

Table A7
Model for the cluster C countries

Table A8
Model for the cluster D countries

This is an Open Access article distributed under a a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC-BY-NC) which permits non commercial use and redistribution, as long as you give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.

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