Public Sector Economics



Tax mimicking in Spanish municipalities: expenditure spillovers, yardstick competition, or tax competition?

Francisco Bastida*
Bernardino Benito*
María-Dolores Guillamón*
Ana-María Ríos*
Article   |   Year:  2019   |   Pages:  115 - 139   |   Volume:  43   |   Issue:  2
Received:  April 12, 2019   |   Accepted:  May 8, 2019   |   Published online:  June 10, 2019
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  June, 2019
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