Taxpayers' attitudes toward tax compliance in the Slovenian tax system: differences according to gender, income level and size of settlement

Hauptman, Lidija; Žmuk, Berislav; Pavić, Ivana

doi:10.3326/pse.48.2.3.

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Taxpayers' attitudes toward tax compliance in the Slovenian tax system: differences according to gender, income level and size of settlement

Lidija Hauptman

Berislav Žmuk

Ivana Pavić

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https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.48.2.3

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Table 1
List of observed questions and variables

Code	Questionnaire variables	Theoretical dimension
TC	I feel a moral obligation to pay my taxes.	Tax compliance
EF1	To my knowledge, I can deduct all personal expenses in calculating my tax liability.	Knowledge of paying taxes
EF2	Taxpayers cannot object or make appeal against Tax Authority assessments.	Knowledge of the tax system
EF3	If tax rates are too high tax evasion is morally acceptable.	Tax evasion attitude
EF4	I pay taxes because the risk of being audited is too high.	Probability of audit
EF5	Serious enforcement and penalty by the FURS may result if I do not comply.	Probability of punishment
PF1	I would feel guilty-bad if I did not pay my full share of taxes.	Feeling bad if evade
PF2	Working for cash-in-hand payment without paying tax is a trivial offence.	Disapprove of shadow purchases
PF3	Paying taxes is one of the basic duties of citizenship.	Important obligation
PF4	Not paying taxes is one of the worst crimes a person can commit because it harms the whole community.	Disapprove of shadow work
PF5	Tax Authority in Slovenia can be trusted to administer the tax system fairly.	Trust in the government /Tax Authority
PF6	It is fair that individuals who deliberately evade their taxes should be penalized with the same amount of penalty regardless of the amount of tax evaded.	Fairness of punishment
PF7	The government ensures services, facilities, and infrastructure for which I am very thankful.	Satisfaction with public services
PF8	I personally believe that the tax system in Slovenia is fair.	Fairness of the tax system
PF9	I would pay taxes even if there were no tax audits.	General tax compliance
PF10	People in my environment would strongly disapprove if I did not meet my tax obligations.	Normative expectations
PF11	My relatives do not comply, and they have never been penalized.	Empirical expectations

Table 3
Structure and main descriptive statistics of responses on tax-related questions, n = 390

Code	Responses (%)					Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Median	Max.	Skewness
Code	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Median	Max.	Skewness
TC	2	7	22	27	42	4.00	1.06	1	4	5	-0.82
EF1	21	18	41	13	7	2.65	1.15	1	3	5	0.12
EF2	25	26	27	16	6	2.53	1.21	1	2	5	0.33
EF3	31	26	24	13	5	2.34	1.19	1	2	5	0.50
EF4	8	8	24	23	37	3.74	1.26	1	4	5	-0.69
EF5	22	41	28	8	2	2.26	0.94	1	2	5	0.48
PF1	4	8	29	24	35	3.79	1.12	1	4	5	-0.57
PF2	20	21	31	20	7	2.74	1.20	1	3	5	0.07
PF3	10	23	43	16	8	2.90	1.06	1	3	5	0.11
PF4	10	20	28	28	14	3.15	1.19	1	3	5	-0.16
PF5	9	17	45	24	5	3.01	0.98	1	3	5	-0.24
PF6	27	15	26	17	14	2.76	1.39	1	3	5	0.14
PF7	9	40	37	10	4	2.60	0.92	1	3	5	0.49
PF8	12	36	32	15	5	2.64	1.02	1	3	5	0.36
PF9	9	12	28	25	26	3.46	1.24	1	4	5	-0.39
PF10	7	12	43	24	14	3.27	1.06	1	3	5	-0.18
PF11	2	9	22	27	39	3.92	1.08	1	4	5	-0.69

Table 4
Structure and main descriptive statistics of responses on tax-related questions, n = 390
Correlation matrix, polychoric correlation, tax-related questions, n = 390 respondents

Variable	TC	EF1	EF2	EF3	EF4	EF5	PF1	PF2	PF3	PF4	PF5	PF6	PF7	PF8	PF9	PF10
EF1	-0.05
EF2	-0.10	0.34
EF3	-0.29	0.11	0.18
EF4	0.16	0.09	0.10	-0.14
EF5	-0.17	0.11	0.10	0.10	-0.27
PF1	0.72	-0.04	-0.08	-0.29	0.32	-0.21
PF2	-0.18	0.34	0.25	0.16	0.15	0.04	-0.26
PF3	0.30	0.02	-0.05	-0.17	0.16	0.01	0.41	-0.12
PF4	0.33	-0.09	-0.10	-0.28	0.00	-0.12	0.38	-0.19	0.52
PF5	0.18	0.14	0.00	-0.15	-0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.09	0.10
PF6	-0.11	0.41	0.29	0.09	0.13	0.08	-0.09	0.21	-0.05	-0.01	0.06
PF7	-0.11	-0.07	0.16	0.08	0.09	0.10	-0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.10	-0.32	0.07
PF8	0.15	0.01	-0.18	-.013	0.00	-0.03	0.16	-0.12	0.06	0.13	0.30	0.08	-0.22
PF9	0.68	-0.04	-0.09	-0.34	0.04	0.04	0.59	-0.19	0.34	0.30	0.20	-0.09	-0.07	0.13
PF10	0.34	0.07	0.12	-0.10	0.13	-0.13	0.25	0.06	0.12	0.13	0.25	0.16	-0.13	0.04	0.37
PF11	0.18	-0.33	-0.27	-0.23	0.10	-0.31	0.21	-0.24	-0.03	-0.04	-0.07	-0.23	0.02	0.13	0.11	-0.07

sfNote: Polychoric correlation values higher than 0.50 are in bold.

Table 5
Chi-square test of independence, attitude on tax-related questions vs. gender

Code	Number of		Number of		Sample size	Emp. Chi-square	p-value	H₀
Code	disagreements		agreements		Sample size	Emp. Chi-square	p-value	H₀
	Male	Female	Male	Female
TC	21	14	116	154	305	3.63	0.0566	Not rejected
EF1	68	87	39	37	231	1.14	0.2863	Not rejected
EF2	91	107	48	38	284	2.33	0.1269	Not rejected
EF3	100	125	38	32	295	2.08	0.1495	Not rejected
EF4	32	31	113	121	297	0.12	0.7242	Not rejected
EF5	114	131	19	17	281	0.49	0.4833	Not rejected
PF1	29	17	100	132	278	6.14	0.0132	Rejected
PF2	67	93	60	48	268	4.84	0.0278	Rejected
PF3	61	67	41	55	224	0.54	0.4618	Not rejected
PF4	61	57	71	91	280	1.70	0.1928	Not rejected
PF5	49	50	55	60	214	0.06	0.8076	Not rejected
PF6	88	78	58	65	289	0.97	0.3247	Not rejected
PF7	92	98	28	26	244	0.20	0.6563	Not rejected
PF8	96	93	37	39	265	0.10	0.7561	Not rejected
PF9	45	38	86	110	279	2.50	0.1137	Not rejected
PF10	38	34	64	85	221	1.89	0.1697	Not rejected
PF11	25	20	119	141	305	1.47	0.2247	Not rejected

Table 6
Chi-square test of independence, attitude on tax-related questions vs. gross income

Code	No. of disagreements			No. of agreements			Sample size	Emp. Chi-square	p-value	H₀
Code	Low income	Medium income	High income	Low income	Medium income	High income	Sample size	Emp. Chi-square	p-value	H₀
TC	5	15	8	32	131	50	241	0.65	0.7213	Not rejected
EF1	12	75	31	10	28	18	174	3.42	0.1809	Not rejected
EF2	31	99	38	8	38	15	229	0.91	0.6349	Not rejected
EF3	24	116	39	16	31	12	238	6.09	0.0477	Rejected
EF4	4	33	14	31	122	34	238	3.79	0.1505	Not rejected
EF5	26	130	36	6	12	8	218	4.69	0.0958	Not rejected
PF1	6	19	10	30	118	39	222	1.19	0.5520	Not rejected
PF2	21	79	33	15	59	13	220	3.11	0.2110	Not rejected
PF3	15	63	21	19	44	12	174	3.05	0.2180	Not rejected
PF4	19	55	20	20	77	30	221	0.78	0.6763	Not rejected
PF5	18	44	18	11	59	20	170	3.40	0.1824	Not rejected
PF6	22	73	37	14	66	16	228	4.89	0.0868	Not rejected
PF7	20	89	43	9	21	9	191	2.44	0.2952	Not rejected
PF8	21	91	31	9	35	20	207	2.24	0.3267	Not rejected
PF9	14	46	10	17	91	41	219	6.23	0.0444	Rejected
PF10	14	33	12	13	65	32	169	4.61	0.1000	Not rejected
PF11	3	21	9	33	134	46	246	1.21	0.5449	Not rejected

Note: Decision made based on significance level of 0.05; df = 2.

Table 7
Chi-square test of independence, attitude on tax-related questions vs. settlement type

Code	Number of		Number of		Sample size	Emp. Chi-square	p-value	H₀
Code	disagreements		agreements		Sample size	Emp. Chi-square	p-value	H₀
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
TC	21	14	101	169	305	6.59	0.0103	Rejected
EF1	60	95	33	43	231	0.47	0.4927	Not rejected
EF2	79	119	40	46	284	1.08	0.2994	Not rejected
EF3	88	137	35	35	295	2.60	0.1066	Not rejected
EF4	28	35	92	142	297	0.54	0.4616	Not rejected
EF5	89	156	15	21	281	0.38	0.5355	Not rejected
PF1	23	23	89	143	278	2.16	0.1415	Not rejected
PF2	69	91	41	67	268	0.71	0.3994	Not rejected
PF3	49	79	35	61	224	0.08	0.7803	Not rejected
PF4	46	72	68	94	280	0.25	0.6148	HNot rejected
PF5	40	59	48	67	214	0.04	0.8431	Not rejected
PF6	55	111	66	57	289	12.23	0.0004	Rejected
PF7	77	113	26	28	244	1.00	0.3170	Not rejected
PF8	68	121	36	40	265	2.95	0.0859	Not rejected
PF9	37	46	84	112	279	0.07	0.7909	Not rejected
PF10	36	36	65	84	221	0.80	0.3725	Not rejected
PF11	21	24	101	159	305	0.98	0.3228	Not rejected

Note: Decision made based on significance level of 0.05; df = 1.

This is an Open Access article distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC-BY-NC) which permits non commercial use and redistribution, as long as you give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.

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