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Taxpayers' attitudes toward tax compliance in the Slovenian tax system: differences according to gender, income level and size of settlement
Lidija Hauptman
Lidija Hauptman
Affiliation: Department of Accounting and Auditing, University of Maribor, Faculty of Economics and Business, Maribor, Slovenia
0009-0005-2282-7804
Correspondence
lidija.hauptman@um.si
Berislav Žmuk
Berislav Žmuk
Affiliation: Department of Statistics, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Economics and Business, Zagreb, Croatia
0000-0003-3487-1376
Ivana Pavić
Ivana Pavić
Affiliation: Department of Accounting, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Economics and Business, Zagreb, Croatia
0000-0002-1597-3652
Article | Year: 2024 | Pages: 177 - 201 | Volume: 48 | Issue: 2 Received: September 29, 2023 | Accepted: February 16, 2024 | Published online: June 10, 2024
|
FULL ARTICLE
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Code
|
Questionnaire variables
|
Theoretical dimension
|
TC
|
I feel a moral obligation to pay my
taxes.
|
Tax compliance
|
EF1
|
To my knowledge, I can deduct all
personal expenses in calculating my tax liability.
|
Knowledge of paying taxes
|
EF2
|
Taxpayers cannot object or make appeal
against Tax Authority assessments.
|
Knowledge of the tax system
|
EF3
|
If tax rates are too high tax evasion is morally
acceptable.
|
Tax evasion attitude
|
EF4
|
I pay taxes because the risk of being
audited is too high.
|
Probability of audit
|
EF5
|
Serious enforcement and penalty by the
FURS may result if I do not comply.
|
Probability of punishment
|
PF1
|
I would feel guilty-bad if I did not pay
my full share of taxes.
|
Feeling bad if evade
|
PF2
|
Working for cash-in-hand payment without
paying tax is a trivial offence.
|
Disapprove of shadow purchases
|
PF3
|
Paying taxes is one of the basic duties
of citizenship.
|
Important obligation
|
PF4
|
Not paying taxes is one of the worst
crimes a person can commit because it harms the whole community.
|
Disapprove of shadow work
|
PF5
|
Tax Authority in Slovenia can be trusted
to administer the tax system fairly.
|
Trust in the government /Tax Authority
|
PF6
|
It is fair that individuals who
deliberately evade their taxes should be penalized with the same amount of
penalty regardless of the amount of tax evaded.
|
Fairness of punishment
|
PF7
|
The government ensures services,
facilities, and infrastructure for which I am very thankful.
|
Satisfaction with public services
|
PF8
|
I personally believe that the tax system
in Slovenia is fair.
|
Fairness of the tax system
|
PF9
|
I would pay taxes even if there were no
tax audits.
|
General tax compliance
|
PF10
|
People in my environment would strongly
disapprove if I did not meet my tax obligations.
|
Normative expectations
|
PF11
|
My relatives do not comply, and they have
never been penalized.
|
Empirical expectations
|
Variable
|
Categories
|
No. of respondents
|
Share of respondents, %
|
Gender
|
Male
|
187
|
48
|
Female
|
203
|
52
|
Gross
income
|
Low income
|
47
|
12
|
Medium
income
|
196
|
50
|
High
income
|
67
|
17
|
I prefer
not to answer
|
80
|
21
|
Settlement
|
Urban
settlement
|
157
|
40
|
Rural
settlement
|
233
|
60
|
Code
|
Responses
(%)
|
Mean
|
St. dev.
|
Min.
|
Median
|
Max.
|
Skewness
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
4
|
5
|
TC
|
2
|
7
|
22
|
27
|
42
|
4.00
|
1.06
|
1
|
4
|
5
|
-0.82
|
EF1
|
21
|
18
|
41
|
13
|
7
|
2.65
|
1.15
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
0.12
|
EF2
|
25
|
26
|
27
|
16
|
6
|
2.53
|
1.21
|
1
|
2
|
5
|
0.33
|
EF3
|
31
|
26
|
24
|
13
|
5
|
2.34
|
1.19
|
1
|
2
|
5
|
0.50
|
EF4
|
8
|
8
|
24
|
23
|
37
|
3.74
|
1.26
|
1
|
4
|
5
|
-0.69
|
EF5
|
22
|
41
|
28
|
8
|
2
|
2.26
|
0.94
|
1
|
2
|
5
|
0.48
|
PF1
|
4
|
8
|
29
|
24
|
35
|
3.79
|
1.12
|
1
|
4
|
5
|
-0.57
|
PF2
|
20
|
21
|
31
|
20
|
7
|
2.74
|
1.20
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
0.07
|
PF3
|
10
|
23
|
43
|
16
|
8
|
2.90
|
1.06
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
0.11
|
PF4
|
10
|
20
|
28
|
28
|
14
|
3.15
|
1.19
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
-0.16
|
PF5
|
9
|
17
|
45
|
24
|
5
|
3.01
|
0.98
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
-0.24
|
PF6
|
27
|
15
|
26
|
17
|
14
|
2.76
|
1.39
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
0.14
|
PF7
|
9
|
40
|
37
|
10
|
4
|
2.60
|
0.92
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
0.49
|
PF8
|
12
|
36
|
32
|
15
|
5
|
2.64
|
1.02
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
0.36
|
PF9
|
9
|
12
|
28
|
25
|
26
|
3.46
|
1.24
|
1
|
4
|
5
|
-0.39
|
PF10
|
7
|
12
|
43
|
24
|
14
|
3.27
|
1.06
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
-0.18
|
PF11
|
2
|
9
|
22
|
27
|
39
|
3.92
|
1.08
|
1
|
4
|
5
|
-0.69
|
Variable
|
TC
|
EF1
|
EF2
|
EF3
|
EF4
|
EF5
|
PF1
|
PF2
|
PF3
|
PF4
|
PF5
|
PF6
|
PF7
|
PF8
|
PF9
|
PF10
|
EF1
|
-0.05
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EF2
|
-0.10
|
0.34
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EF3
|
-0.29
|
0.11
|
0.18
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EF4
|
0.16
|
0.09
|
0.10
|
-0.14
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EF5
|
-0.17
|
0.11
|
0.10
|
0.10
|
-0.27
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PF1
|
0.72
|
-0.04
|
-0.08
|
-0.29
|
0.32
|
-0.21
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PF2
|
-0.18
|
0.34
|
0.25
|
0.16
|
0.15
|
0.04
|
-0.26
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PF3
|
0.30
|
0.02
|
-0.05
|
-0.17
|
0.16
|
0.01
|
0.41
|
-0.12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PF4
|
0.33
|
-0.09
|
-0.10
|
-0.28
|
0.00
|
-0.12
|
0.38
|
-0.19
|
0.52
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PF5
|
0.18
|
0.14
|
0.00
|
-0.15
|
-0.06
|
-0.02
|
0.06
|
-0.01
|
0.09
|
0.10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PF6
|
-0.11
|
0.41
|
0.29
|
0.09
|
0.13
|
0.08
|
-0.09
|
0.21
|
-0.05
|
-0.01
|
0.06
|
|
|
|
|
|
PF7
|
-0.11
|
-0.07
|
0.16
|
0.08
|
0.09
|
0.10
|
-0.05
|
0.04
|
0.04
|
-0.10
|
-0.32
|
0.07
|
|
|
|
|
PF8
|
0.15
|
0.01
|
-0.18
|
-.013
|
0.00
|
-0.03
|
0.16
|
-0.12
|
0.06
|
0.13
|
0.30
|
0.08
|
-0.22
|
|
|
|
PF9
|
0.68
|
-0.04
|
-0.09
|
-0.34
|
0.04
|
0.04
|
0.59
|
-0.19
|
0.34
|
0.30
|
0.20
|
-0.09
|
-0.07
|
0.13
|
|
|
PF10
|
0.34
|
0.07
|
0.12
|
-0.10
|
0.13
|
-0.13
|
0.25
|
0.06
|
0.12
|
0.13
|
0.25
|
0.16
|
-0.13
|
0.04
|
0.37
|
|
PF11
|
0.18
|
-0.33
|
-0.27
|
-0.23
|
0.10
|
-0.31
|
0.21
|
-0.24
|
-0.03
|
-0.04
|
-0.07
|
-0.23
|
0.02
|
0.13
|
0.11
|
-0.07
|
sf Note: Polychoric correlation values higher than 0.50 are in bold.
Code
|
Number of
|
Number of
|
Sample size
|
Emp.
Chi-square
|
p-value
|
H0
|
disagreements
|
agreements
|
|
Male
|
Female
|
Male
|
Female
|
|
|
|
|
TC
|
21
|
14
|
116
|
154
|
305
|
3.63
|
0.0566
|
Not rejected
|
EF1
|
68
|
87
|
39
|
37
|
231
|
1.14
|
0.2863
|
Not rejected
|
EF2
|
91
|
107
|
48
|
38
|
284
|
2.33
|
0.1269
|
Not rejected
|
EF3
|
100
|
125
|
38
|
32
|
295
|
2.08
|
0.1495
|
Not rejected
|
EF4
|
32
|
31
|
113
|
121
|
297
|
0.12
|
0.7242
|
Not rejected
|
EF5
|
114
|
131
|
19
|
17
|
281
|
0.49
|
0.4833
|
Not rejected
|
PF1
|
29
|
17
|
100
|
132
|
278
|
6.14
|
0.0132
|
Rejected
|
PF2
|
67
|
93
|
60
|
48
|
268
|
4.84
|
0.0278
|
Rejected
|
PF3
|
61
|
67
|
41
|
55
|
224
|
0.54
|
0.4618
|
Not rejected
|
PF4
|
61
|
57
|
71
|
91
|
280
|
1.70
|
0.1928
|
Not rejected
|
PF5
|
49
|
50
|
55
|
60
|
214
|
0.06
|
0.8076
|
Not rejected
|
PF6
|
88
|
78
|
58
|
65
|
289
|
0.97
|
0.3247
|
Not rejected
|
PF7
|
92
|
98
|
28
|
26
|
244
|
0.20
|
0.6563
|
Not rejected
|
PF8
|
96
|
93
|
37
|
39
|
265
|
0.10
|
0.7561
|
Not rejected
|
PF9
|
45
|
38
|
86
|
110
|
279
|
2.50
|
0.1137
|
Not rejected
|
PF10
|
38
|
34
|
64
|
85
|
221
|
1.89
|
0.1697
|
Not rejected
|
PF11
|
25
|
20
|
119
|
141
|
305
|
1.47
|
0.2247
|
Not rejected
|
Code
|
No. of
disagreements
|
No. of
agreements
|
Sample
size
|
Emp.
Chi-square
|
p-value
|
H0
|
Low
income
|
Medium
income
|
High
income
|
Low
income
|
Medium
income
|
High
income
|
TC
|
5
|
15
|
8
|
32
|
131
|
50
|
241
|
0.65
|
0.7213
|
Not rejected
|
EF1
|
12
|
75
|
31
|
10
|
28
|
18
|
174
|
3.42
|
0.1809
|
Not rejected
|
EF2
|
31
|
99
|
38
|
8
|
38
|
15
|
229
|
0.91
|
0.6349
|
Not rejected
|
EF3
|
24
|
116
|
39
|
16
|
31
|
12
|
238
|
6.09
|
0.0477
|
Rejected
|
EF4
|
4
|
33
|
14
|
31
|
122
|
34
|
238
|
3.79
|
0.1505
|
Not rejected
|
EF5
|
26
|
130
|
36
|
6
|
12
|
8
|
218
|
4.69
|
0.0958
|
Not rejected
|
PF1
|
6
|
19
|
10
|
30
|
118
|
39
|
222
|
1.19
|
0.5520
|
Not rejected
|
PF2
|
21
|
79
|
33
|
15
|
59
|
13
|
220
|
3.11
|
0.2110
|
Not rejected
|
PF3
|
15
|
63
|
21
|
19
|
44
|
12
|
174
|
3.05
|
0.2180
|
Not rejected
|
PF4
|
19
|
55
|
20
|
20
|
77
|
30
|
221
|
0.78
|
0.6763
|
Not rejected
|
PF5
|
18
|
44
|
18
|
11
|
59
|
20
|
170
|
3.40
|
0.1824
|
Not rejected
|
PF6
|
22
|
73
|
37
|
14
|
66
|
16
|
228
|
4.89
|
0.0868
|
Not rejected
|
PF7
|
20
|
89
|
43
|
9
|
21
|
9
|
191
|
2.44
|
0.2952
|
Not rejected
|
PF8
|
21
|
91
|
31
|
9
|
35
|
20
|
207
|
2.24
|
0.3267
|
Not rejected
|
PF9
|
14
|
46
|
10
|
17
|
91
|
41
|
219
|
6.23
|
0.0444
|
Rejected
|
PF10
|
14
|
33
|
12
|
13
|
65
|
32
|
169
|
4.61
|
0.1000
|
Not rejected
|
PF11
|
3
|
21
|
9
|
33
|
134
|
46
|
246
|
1.21
|
0.5449
|
Not rejected
|
Note: Decision made based on significance level of 0.05; df = 2.
Code
|
Number of
|
Number of
|
Sample size
|
Emp. Chi-square
|
p-value
|
H0
|
disagreements
|
agreements
|
|
Urban
|
Rural
|
Urban
|
Rural
|
|
|
|
|
TC
|
21
|
14
|
101
|
169
|
305
|
6.59
|
0.0103
|
Rejected
|
EF1
|
60
|
95
|
33
|
43
|
231
|
0.47
|
0.4927
|
Not rejected
|
EF2
|
79
|
119
|
40
|
46
|
284
|
1.08
|
0.2994
|
Not rejected
|
EF3
|
88
|
137
|
35
|
35
|
295
|
2.60
|
0.1066
|
Not rejected
|
EF4
|
28
|
35
|
92
|
142
|
297
|
0.54
|
0.4616
|
Not rejected
|
EF5
|
89
|
156
|
15
|
21
|
281
|
0.38
|
0.5355
|
Not rejected
|
PF1
|
23
|
23
|
89
|
143
|
278
|
2.16
|
0.1415
|
Not rejected
|
PF2
|
69
|
91
|
41
|
67
|
268
|
0.71
|
0.3994
|
Not rejected
|
PF3
|
49
|
79
|
35
|
61
|
224
|
0.08
|
0.7803
|
Not rejected
|
PF4
|
46
|
72
|
68
|
94
|
280
|
0.25
|
0.6148
|
HNot rejected
|
PF5
|
40
|
59
|
48
|
67
|
214
|
0.04
|
0.8431
|
Not rejected
|
PF6
|
55
|
111
|
66
|
57
|
289
|
12.23
|
0.0004
|
Rejected
|
PF7
|
77
|
113
|
26
|
28
|
244
|
1.00
|
0.3170
|
Not rejected
|
PF8
|
68
|
121
|
36
|
40
|
265
|
2.95
|
0.0859
|
Not rejected
|
PF9
|
37
|
46
|
84
|
112
|
279
|
0.07
|
0.7909
|
Not rejected
|
PF10
|
36
|
36
|
65
|
84
|
221
|
0.80
|
0.3725
|
Not rejected
|
PF11
|
21
|
24
|
101
|
159
|
305
|
0.98
|
0.3228
|
Not rejected
|
Note: Decision made based on significance level of 0.05; df = 1.
Ajzen, I., 1991. The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), pp. 179-211 [ CrossRef]
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