Public Sector Economics

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The political economy of local government in Croatia: winning coalitions, corruption, and taxes



Vuk Vuković*
Article   |   Year:  2017   |   Pages:  387 - 420   |   Volume:  41   |   Issue:  4
Received:  June 1, 2017   |   Accepted:  October 20, 2017   |   Published online:  December 11, 2017
Download citation        https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.41.4.1       


Table 1
Summary statistics
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Table 2
Impact of winning coalition size on tenure in power
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Table 3
Impact of winning coalition size on corruption
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Graph 1
Smaller winning coalition size environments on average exhibit greater levels of corruption
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Table 4
Impact of corruption on re-election in small and large winning coalitions
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Graph 2
A small winning coalition environment has on average higher local tax rates
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Table 5
Impact of winning coalition size on local tax rates
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Graph 3
A comparison of sample balancing using four different matching algorithms
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Table 6
Comparing the results for different matching algorithms
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Graph 4
A balanced sample using entropy balancing (triangles), compared with an unbalanced sample (diamonds), and a sample matched using propensity score matching (circles)
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Table 7
Entropy balancing
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Table A1
Variables used in analysis, their description and sources
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  December, 2017
IV/2017
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