Public Sector Economics

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The political economy of local government in Croatia: winning coalitions, corruption, and taxes



Vuk Vuković*
Article   |   Year:  2017   |   Pages:  387 - 420   |   Volume:  41   |   Issue:  4
Received:  June 1, 2017   |   Accepted:  October 20, 2017   |   Published online:  December 11, 2017
Download citation        https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.41.4.1       


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  December, 2017
IV/2017
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